How is credit concentration risk measured at banks?
Credit concentration risk at a bank is the dependence of potential losses in a loan portfolio on a small number of borrowers, connected companies or a shared economic driver. A bank may appear to have many separate loan contracts, yet the economic risk can still be concentrated if companies in one group finance one another or rely on the same revenue source. An initial measure therefore compares the aggregate exposure to a selected counterparty or group of connected counterparties with the appropriate capital base. In a simplified example, suppose a bank has 100 billion lira of Tier 1 capital, a 12-billion-lira exposure to company A and a 9-billion-lira exposure to company B, which is economically connected to A. If no other adjustments apply, the combined exposure is 21 billion and its ratio to Tier 1 capital is 21 percent. This is not a reported ratio for a real bank or a conclusion that any regulatory limit has been breached. An actual calculation must determine which persons form one risk group, how off-balance-sheet commitments are converted, when collateral and guarantees are recognised, and what exemptions and reporting perimeter apply. The BRSA explained its risk-group and lending-limit regulation, effective from the beginning of 2024, as a way to prevent concentration; the Basel Committee's large-exposures framework defines connected counterparties and measurement against Tier 1 capital. One percentage does not describe all portfolio concentration. Borrowers from different groups may still default together when they depend on the same industry, region, collateral type or exchange-rate shock. Analysts also examine sector and regional shares, the largest borrower groups, stress scenarios and maturity clusters. A high exposure share does not necessarily mean that a loss has occurred, while a small share does not mean that a loan is safe; repayment capacity and the realisability of collateral are separate questions. Comparisons must align the reporting date, solo or consolidated scope, definition of capital, currency and exposure amounts before and after risk mitigation. Regulatory limits and implementation details can change, so the BRSA's currently effective text and the bank's latest audited disclosures should be checked before a decision. This article explains the measurement logic for education, not as credit or investment advice.
Defining the risk group and calculating a simple ratio
1. Which borrowers belong to one risk group? The first measurement step is to examine whether borrowers that are legally separate may be affected together because of control or economic dependence. Treating loans to two companies under the same ultimate control as small, unrelated limits can hide concentration. If most of one company's revenue depends on payments from the other, their possible joint failure calls for additional examination. The Basel large-exposures framework builds its connected-counterparty concept around this risk of common distress. BRSA risk-group rules determine the legal classification and limit calculation in Türkiye. A group map should be updated using ownership chains, guarantees, major customers and supply relationships; different company names or tax identifiers alone do not prove independence. Not every business relationship automatically creates one group: the applicable regulatory criteria and concrete evidence are necessary. 2. How are the numerator and denominator chosen? The numerator is the sum of the relevant exposure amounts to the identified person or risk group. Alongside loans, the treatment of guarantees, letters of credit, derivatives and undrawn commitments must be checked under the applicable conversion and netting rules. Collateral or another risk mitigant may change how some exposure is attributed; amounts before and after mitigation should therefore be distinguished. The denominator is the Tier 1 capital or own-funds base required by the applicable rule, not total assets, total loans or deposits. The BRSA announcement describes limits linked to both capital bases. Dividing a solo exposure measure by consolidated capital in the same calculation would distort the comparison. Capital and exposure should come from the same reporting date and perimeter. 3. How does a hypothetical group example work? Suppose a hypothetical bank has 100 billion lira of Tier 1 capital and relevant exposure amounts of 12 billion to company A and 9 billion to connected company B. If the connection criteria are met and no further adjustment is assumed for the illustration, the group total is 21 billion. Dividing 21 by 100 and multiplying by 100 yields 21 percent. Tracking A alone at 12 percent and B alone at 9 percent would understate the group exposure. If a new commitment to B of 4 billion were fully included under the applicable rules, the total would rise to 25 billion and the simple ratio to 25 percent. Real commitment conversion and exemptions could produce a different result; the illustration is not a legal compliance assessment. If capital fell to 80 billion, the unchanged 21-billion exposure would equal 26.25 percent, showing that denominator movements alone can raise the concentration indicator.
Common drivers, comparison and interpretive limits
4. Why is the large-borrower ratio not enough? A bank may have no single unusually large risk group, yet most of its portfolio might depend on the same construction cycle, commodity price or drought in one region. Such a shock can weaken the cash flows of many formally separate borrowers simultaneously. Analysts therefore also track the combined share of the five or ten largest groups, sectoral and regional distribution, common collateral providers and maturity clusters. When adding portfolio percentages, they must explain whether one borrower is counted again across different dimensions. Stress testing considers how a plausible common shock could jointly affect revenue, collateral values and repayment, rather than merely repeating past default frequencies. These measures complement, but do not replace, the regulatory single-counterparty limit. 5. How should periods and banks be compared? First confirm that exposure and capital are measured at the same date. Do not compare a solo bank with a consolidated group, pre-mitigation with post-mitigation amounts, or cash loans with the full set of relevant exposures without adjustment. A falling ratio may reflect debt collection, transfer of risk to another group, new capital, recognition of collateral or currency translation; it does not by itself prove improved borrower diversification. Sector shares also vary by currency and line of business. The BRSA's effective rules should be read alongside the bank's notes and risk-management disclosures. Thresholds in the Basel framework must not be presumed to apply directly in every Turkish special case; local regulation and current decisions take precedence. 6. What does the ratio not prove, and how should it be used? A credit concentration ratio makes a large shared risk point visible before any loss occurs; it is not itself a default probability or expected-loss amount. The hypothetical group at 21 percent could repay from strong cash flow, while a much smaller group could generate a loss. Whether collateral is legally valid, reasonably valued and realisable in time requires separate analysis. An exposure near a group limit may call for closer monitoring under risk appetite, internal limits and stress testing, but this simple ratio alone cannot establish regulatory compliance. Off-balance-sheet items, exemptions, risk mitigation and capital adjustments have to be considered before deciding whether a legal threshold is met. Public reports often do not disclose confidential borrower-level details; uncertainty should be stated and this educational explanation should not be converted into individual credit, deposit or investment advice.